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1 
HOW GOOGLE PERCEIVES CUSTOMER PRIVACY, 
CYBER, E-COMMERCE, POLITICAL AND 
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE RISKS 
LAWRENCE J. TRAUTMAN? 
ABSTRACT 
By now, almost every business has an Internet presence. What 
are the major risks perceived by those engaged in the universe of 
Internet businesses? What potential risks, if they become reality, 
may cause substantial increases in operating costs or threaten the 
very survival of the enterprise? 
This Article discusses the relevant annual report disclosures 
from Alphabet, Inc. (parent of Google), along with other Google 
documents, as a potentially powerful teaching device. Most of the 
descriptive language to follow is excerpted directly from Alphabet’s 
(Google) regulatory filings. My additions about these entities include 
weaving their disclosure materials into a logical presentation and 
providing supplemental sources for those who desire a deeper look 
(usually in my footnotes) at any particular aspect. I have sought to 
present a roadmap with these materials that shows Google’s struggle 
to optimize their business performance while navigating through 
a complicated maze of regulatory compliance concerns and issues 
involving governmental jurisdictions throughout the world. Inter-
national cybercrime and risk issues follow, with an examination 
of anti–money laundering, counterterrorist, and other potential 
illegal activity laws. 
The value proposition offered here is disarmingly simple—
at no out-of-pocket cost, the reader has an opportunity to invest 
probably just a few hours to read and reflect upon the Alphabet, 
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Inc. (Google) multiple-million-dollar research, investment and doc-
umentation of perceived Internet, e-commerce, cyber, IT, and elec-
tronic payment system risks. Hopefully, this will prove of value to 
those either interested in the rapidly changing dynamics of (1) 
electronic payment systems, (2) those engaged in Internet site opera-
tions, or (3) those engaged in fighting cybercrime activities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article seeks to answer the questions facing all global 
businesses: “What are the major cyber risks perceived by those 
engaged in the universe of Internet businesses? What potential 
risks, if they become reality, may cause substantial increases in 
operating costs or threaten the very survival of the enterprise?”1 
In today’s interconnected world, the relevant legal environment 
far exceeds those concerns and constraints of our home countries 
and has become truly worldwide in reach.2 Interest shown to-
wards my prior PayPal article, as demonstrated by the numerous 
downloads from the Social Sciences Research Network (SSRN),3 
is a source of pleasant surprise and delight. 
A. Value Proposition 
This Article provides a roadmap about how a reader may 
gain substantial traction toward understanding cyber risk with-
in just a few additional hours. 
“To survive, all successful entrepreneurs must become highly 
skillful at optimizing efficiency at every opportunity.”4 For any en-
terprise conducting global business, the “cost of accounting and legal 
fees and management time devoted to the discovery, examination 
and documentation of the perceived threat to the enterprise from 
cyber, e-commerce, information technology and electronic payment 
system risks” are considerable.5 This value proposition to the reader 
is disarmingly simple—at no out-of-pocket cost, the reader has an 
opportunity to invest just a few hours to read and reflect upon 
                                                                                                                        
1 Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce and Electronic Payment System Risks: 
Lessons from PayPal, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261, 263 (2016). 
2 Id. at 299 (citing Tabrez Ahmad, Information & Communication Technology 
Law (Dec. 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969493 
[https://perma.cc/QYP9-4T56].  
3 Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce, Cyber, and Electronic Payment System 
Risks: Lessons from Paypal, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261 (Spring 2016), SSRN 
(last revised Dec. 24, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2314119 [https://perma.cc/G7U7-VRWP]. 
4 Lawrence J. Trautman, Anthony Luppino & Malika S. Simmons, Some Key 
Things U.S. Entrepreneurs Need to Know About The Law and Lawyers, 46 TEX. 
J. BUS. L. 155 (2016). 
5 Trautman, supra note 1, at 261. 
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the multimillion-dollar research, investment and documentation of 
perceived e-commerce, cyber, IT, and electronic payment system 
risk from one of the world’s largest Internet-intensive enterprises. 
“Words are powerful and have meaning.”6 As a basis for 
discussion and analysis about cyber risk, relevant annual report 
disclosures from Alphabet (corporate parent of Google), along with 
other Alphabet and Google documents, are used as a potentially 
powerful teaching device.7 Descriptive language excerpted directly 
from Google’s regulatory filings are utilized to show what manage-
ment of these important economic companies perceive to be their 
major categories of risk exposure. Weaving these materials into a 
logical presentation and providing supplemental sources for those 
who desire a deeper look (usually in my footnotes) is the author’s 
challenge. Hopefully, even the most seasoned Information Technol-
ogy (IT) and cyber security executives benefit by examining Google’s 
struggle to optimize its business performance while navigating 
through a complicated maze of regulatory compliance concerns and 
issues involving governmental jurisdictions throughout the world. 
“The Internet, e-commerce, cyber threats, and new mobile 
platforms and technology are having a major impact on payment 
systems and entrepreneurial business.”8 Both Alphabet and Google 
incur considerable management and legal expense to examine, 
analyze, and describe their perceived information technology and 
e-commerce risk.9 A close examination of the disclosure language 
from these two entities will hopefully prove of value to those readers 
interested in the rapidly changing dynamics of (1) electronic pay-
ment systems, (2) those engaged in Internet site operations, or 
(3) those engaged in fighting cybercrime activities. 
While a twenty-something-year-old MBA business school student 
in Washington, D.C., I was fortunate to have a part-time job 
abstracting and indexing [required corporate disclosure] filings 
(10-Ks, 8-Ks, etc.) under a contract with the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). This experience provided me 
with substantial practice in the review and analysis of corporate 
                                                                                                                        
6 Id. at 263 
7 Id. at 261. 
8 Id. at 264. 
9 See id. at 261 (describing Paypal’s expenses related to their IT and e-
commerce risks). 
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financial statements. A few years later, my early career training 
as a securities analyst and later as an investment banker in New 
York City at Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette provided an intimate 
familiarity with the examination and analysis of corporate filings 
made by corporate securities issuers with the SEC.10 
It was by virtue of conducting this financial securities 
analysis work many years ago that I came to realize the value of 
these massive U.S. disclosure documents (approximately 100 pages 
when financial statements are included) in the case of the Al-
phabet, Inc./Google LLC regulatory filings with the U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission on Form 10-K.11 These documents 
provide an excellent insight for anyone interested in Internet 
platforms’ considerations and new challenges facing Alphabet, 
Inc. and Google LLC as search and electronic commerce platforms 
attempt to accommodate rapid changes in mobile computing and 
device platforms. 
For some readers, this Alphabet, Inc. and Google LLC ar-
ticle may appear to lack the customary structure, look and feel of 
the typical law or business school academic journal article. If this 
bothers you, then this Article was not written for you. In an ear-
lier draft of my eBay article,12 more than one commentator asked 
whether I could just paraphrase some of the heavy quotes of rele-
vant eBay and PayPal disclosure language.13 If this is your reac-
tion, you entirely miss the point. The primary purpose in crafting 
these articles is to repackage PayPal’s (or Google’s) risk disclosure 
language (without my heavy paraphrasing) so that Internet and e-
commerce entrepreneurs and other interested readers may benefit 
from the considerable thought and expense devoted by those closest 
to the situation (under penalty of disclosure liability) to telling their 
story. My goal has been to have meaningful scholarly impact by 
providing individuals who either now, or soon, will be actually creat-
ing jobs through their efforts in growing businesses with valuable 
lessons in cyber domain risks in a highly readable manner and at 
no out-of-pocket cost. Since cybercrime continues to be a highly 
lucrative activity of many international criminal syndicates, lessons 
                                                                                                                        
10 Trautman, supra note 1, at 264. 
11 See Alphabet, Inc., Annual Report (10-K) (Feb. 27, 2017). 
12 Trautman, supra note 1, at 263. 
13 Id. at 264.  
8 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:001 
to learn here from Google’s perceived risk disclosures may also 
prove of interest to those engaged in law enforcement, criminal 
law, and anti-cybercrime activities.14 
I.  RECENT CHANGES IN THE CYBER THREAT LANDSCAPE 
A. Recent Developments 
Major disruptive cyber breaches continue at an alarming 
rate, many sanctioned by nation state actors, and new vulnera-
bility warnings appear almost daily.15 By the second quarter of 
2017, an all-time high number of disclosed vulnerabilities had 
been reached.16 If this trend continues, 2017 appears to be on a 
path to become a record-setting year in the total number of dis-
closed vulnerabilities.17 Exhibit 1 provides a comparison of mid-
year vulnerabilities over a five-year period. 
                                                                                                                        
14 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated 
Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1050 (2017); see 
also Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future 
of Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 234 (2016); Lawrence J. 
Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk 
Road, and Mt. Gox?, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Sept. 16, 2014, Article No. 13 at ¶1; 
see generally Lawrence J. Trautman & David D. Schein, The Dark Web and 
Employer Liability 10 (Sept. 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=3251479 [https://perma.cc/QG7B-MKTL].  
15 See David Orozco, The Knowledge Police, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 417, 417–18 
(2014); see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: 
Who’s Who & How It Works, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 147, 150–51 (2016); 
Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 341, 349 (2015); Lawrence J. Trautman, Following the Money: 
Lessons from the “Panama Papers,” Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 807, 859 (2017) (citing Nicole Hong & Robin Sidel, Hackers Hit Cravath, 
Weil Gotshal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2016, at C1) [hereinafter referred to as 
Following the Money]; Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack The Next Pearl 
Harbor?, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 232, 259–63 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, 
The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis Governance, 13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 275, 
277 (2017) (citing Business Roundtable, Committed to Protecting America: CEO 
Guide to Security Challenges (Feb. 2005), http://www.cj.msu.edu/~outreach/wdm 
/ceo_guide.pdf); Lawrence J. Trautman & Janet Ford, Nonprofit Governance: The 
Basics, 52 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 64–69), http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=3133818 [https://perma.cc/5JDS-RFQ4]. 
16 Vulnerability Quick View, Mid-Year 2017 Vulnerability Trends, RISK 
BASED SECURITY, INC. 3 (July 2017). 
17 Id. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
A COMPARISON OF MID-YEAR 2017 VULNERABILITIES 
TO THE PAST FOUR YEARS18 
Source: Risk Based Security, Inc. 
Statistics for the second quarter of 2017 reveal that the 
largest target of attack traffic is the United States, with the United 
Kingdom in second place, Brazil in third place, Japan in fourth, 
followed by Singapore, Sweden, Germany, India, China and the 
Netherlands in that order.19 Exhibit 2 depicts the Top 10 Target 
Countries for Web Application Attacks, Q2 2017. 
EXHIBIT 2 




19 [State of the Internet] / Security/Q2 2017 Report, 17 AKAMAI TECH., INC. 
(2017). 
20 Id. 
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B. The Yahoo! Breaches and Impact on U.S. Corporate 
Governance 
EXHIBIT 3 
THE ORMEROD-TRAUTMAN PROFIT-MAXIMIZING  





Source: Trautman & Ormerod 
 
During 2016, U.S. Internet pioneer Yahoo! announced that 
personal information had been stolen from the accounts of over 
500 million users during a 2014 digital systems breach.22 Yahoo! 
announced that the stolen information “likely included names, 
birthdays, email addresses, hashed passwords (the vast majority 
with bcrypt), telephone numbers, and, in some cases, encrypted 
or unencrypted security questions and answers. At the time it 
was announced, this 2014 theft represented the largest data breach 
ever.”23 Then, during mid-December 2016, Yahoo! announced yet 
another one billion customer accounts were compromised during 
2013, establishing a new record for the largest known data breach 
                                                                                                                        
21 Id. 
22 Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and 
Officers’ Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1231, 1233 (2017). 
23 Id. (citing Press Release, Yahoo! Inc., An Important Message to Yahoo Users 
on Security (Sept. 22, 2016), https://investor.yahoo.net/releasedetail.cfm?release 
id=990570; Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data on 500 Million Users 
in 2014, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/techno 
logy/yahoo-hackers.html?_r=0) [https://perma.cc/X3CR-43C3]. 
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ever.24 Then, following acquisition of Yahoo! on October 3, 2017, 
new corporate parent Verizon announced that, “during integration, 
the company recently obtained new intelligence and now believes, 
following an investigation with the assistance of outside forensic 
experts, that all Yahoo[!] user accounts were affected by the August 
2013 theft.”25 
In our recent article about the Yahoo! breaches, along with 
my co-author Peter Ormerod, we explore what appears to be the 
profit-maximizing model of data security as depicted in Exhibit 3.26 
From Exhibit 3, we see that at the leftmost point on the 
curve an enterprise’s data security is so abysmal that few, if 
any, users will trust the company with their personal data and 
information.27 Essentially, paying for zero data security measures 
result in zero users and zero profitability.28 However:  
as the company’s security improves, an increasing number of 
users trust the company with their personal information and 
the risk of action by the FTC decreases—both of which contribute 
to increased profitability. At some point—essentially, where the 
number of users is maximized—increased security measures 
begin limiting the usability of the company’s electronic features, 
and thus begin decreasing profitability. Taken to an extreme, 
excessive security measures may, theoretically, drive usability 
to point of futility, rendering profit nonexistent.29 
The Ormerod-Trautman theoretical profit-maximizing ana-
lytical framework assumes that users (both search and e-commerce 
customers) are in a position to ascertain the quality of cyberse-
curity provided.30 As we have seen numerous times, and recently 
                                                                                                                        
24 Id. (citing Robert McMillan, Ryan Knutson & Deepa Seetharaman, Yahoo 
Discloses New Breach of 1 Billion User Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo-discloses-new-breach-of-1-billion-user-ac 
counts-1481753131 [https://perma.cc/V6NT-AYND]). 
25 Yahoo Provides Notice to Additional Users Affected by Previously Disclosed 
2013 Data Theft, OATH (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.oath.com/press/yahoo-pro 
vides-notice-to-additional-users-affected-by-previously/ [https://perma.cc/6773 
-VTKT]. 
26 Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 22, at 1290. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1291. 
30 See id. at 1290–91.  
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in the case of the Yahoo! breaches, considerable delay may occur 
before users become aware their data had been breached.31 
C. Organized Crime and the Internet 
In recent years, transnational organized crime has added 
new lines of business, including industrial espionage and cyber 
theft to their long-standing lines of business staples such as black-
mail, the drug trade, and prostitution.32 Former BBC journalist 
Misha Glenny attributes much of the growth in international or-
ganized crime to the downfall of the Soviet Union, which resulted 
in thousands of former KGB and Eastern European intelligence 
officers seeking new employment in rather unsavory occupations, 
primarily in the highly profitable illicit drug trade.33 We will come 
back to the topic of organized transnational crime in a few minutes 
when we contemplate the impact on political stability caused by 
breaches of secrecy (think Snowden,34 Wikileaks,35 Chelsea 
Manning,36 The Panama Papers,37 and Russian hacking of elec-
tions in the United States and many other countries).38 
                                                                                                                        
31 Yahoo Provides Notice to Additional Users Affected by Previously Disclosed 
2013 Data Theft, supra note 25. 
32 Misha Glenny, Dark Market: Cyberthieves, Cybercops and You, YOUTUBE 
(Jan. 13, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9G3HLPHXPg [https:// 
perma.cc/3QPK-Y5SM]. 
33 Misha Glenny, Misha Glenny Investigates Global Crime Networks, 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XO1Me-MY-Q0 
[https://perma.cc/9VNY-MYHA]. 
34 See Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden: 
Analysis and Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers and Business Leaders, 
The Hague Inst. for Global Just., The Hague Inst. For Global Just. (May 1, 
2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2430275 [https://perma.cc/R5PM-PZGA]. 
35 See David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns 
and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 
514 (2013). 
36 See Margaret B. Kwoka, Leaking and Legitimacy, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1387, 1389–90 (2015). 
37 See Trautman, Following the Money, supra note 15, at 809. 
38 See Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber-Interference in the 2016 Election 
Violate International Law?, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2934321 [https://perma 
.cc/6UUQ-X46D]; see also Richard L. Hasen, The 2016 U.S. Voting Wars: From 
Bad to Worse, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 629, 629 (2018). 
2018] HOW GOOGLE PERCEIVES 13 
II.  GROWTH OF ONLINE COMMERCE AND SEARCH 
It will come as no surprise that the global growth rate of 
online commerce is staggering.39 Online commerce growth seems 
a likely proxy for search usage40 and therefore a reasonable indi-
cator of the potential for Google usage growth during the next few 
years.41 According to Net Market Share, as of September 2018, 
global market share for desktop search engine is as follows: Google 
(78.05%); Baidu (9.82%); Bing (6.69%%); Yahoo! (2.81%); Yandex 
(1.44%); Ask (0.64%); and DuckDuckGo (0.26%).42 Exhibit 4 il-
lustrates global usage of the Internet and population statistics 
as of June 30, 2018. 
 
EXHIBIT 4 
WORLD INTERNET USAGE AND POPULATION STATISTICS,  
JUNE 30, 201843 
 
Source: Internet World Stats 
                                                                                                                        
39 Stefany Zaroban, U.S. e-commerce sales grow 16.0% in 2017, DIGITAL 
COMMERCE 360 (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/article 
/us-ecommerce-sales/ [https://perma.cc/PQ9H-47E9]. 
40 See id.; Desktop Search Engine Market Share, Net Market Share (Nov. 7, 
2017), https://www.netmarketshare.com/search-engine-market-share.aspx?qprid 
=4&qpcustomd=0 [https://perma.cc/GHF3-7SFR]. 
41 Desktop Search Engine Market Share, supra note 40. 
42 Id. 
43 World Internet Users in the World by Regions, INTERNET WORLD STATS 
(June 30, 2018), https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm [https://perma 
.cc/9ZPE-63BM]. 
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“By now, everyone should understand that the continued 
growth of the Internet has resulted in commensurate growth in 
e-commerce.”44 eMarketer reports that during 2017, “2.46 billion 
individuals, or one-third of the global population and 71.0 [per-
cent] of internet users, will access social networks at least once a 
month, up 8.2 [percent] from 2016.45 Mobile phone adoption and 
expanding mobile coverage will drive that growth.”46  
III. DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL RISKS 
A. SEC Disclosure Mandate 
In the United States, companies having publicly traded 
equities or debt are required to make disclosures of all material 
information in periodic filings with the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission.47 
“Mandatory disclosure,” according to Professor Stephen 
Bainbridge, “is a—if not the—defining characteristic of U.S. se-
curities regulation.”48 The U.S. “Congress intended the securi-
ties laws to ‘substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the 
philosophy of caveat emptor ....’”49 “Since the Depression [of the 
1930s], the [U.S.] Securities and Exchange Commission’s totemic 
philosophy has been to promote a robust informational foundation 
for private decision makers, thereby furthering efficiency and 
corporate governance,” states Professor Henry T.C. Hu, the first 
Director of the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation 
                                                                                                                        
44 Trautman, supra note 1, at 265. 
45 eMarketer Updates Worldwide Social Network User Figures, EMARKETER 
(July 17, 2017), https://www.emarketer.com/Article/eMarketer-Updates-World 
wide-Social-Network-User-Figures/1016178 [https://perma.cc/TY9Q-BZJ3]. 
46 Id. 
47 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2012).  
48 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2000) (citing Europe & Overseas Commodity 
Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“Through mandatory disclosure, Congress sought to promote informed investing 
and to deter the kind of fraudulent salesmanship that was believed to have led to 
the market collapse of 1929.”)); see Lawrence J. Trautman & George Michaely, 
The SEC & The Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. 
L.Q. REP. 262 (2014). 
49 Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 1023 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). 
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of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2009–2011).50 
Therefore, under the laws of the United States, disclosure of all 
material facts by issuers of securities offered or trading in the 
United States is the principle at the foundation of federal securi-
ties regulation enforced by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission by virtue of the Securities Act of 193351 (the Securities 
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).52 
Beginning in 2005, the SEC “required all firms to include 
a new section in their annual filings (Section 1A of the Annual 
Report on Form 10-K) to discuss ‘the most significant factors that 
make the company speculative or risky’ (Regulation S-K, Item 
305(c), SEC 2005).”53 According to Professor Tom C.W. Lin: 
 
The objective of the Securities Act is to ensure full and fair 
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and 
foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds 
in the sale thereof…. Pursuant to its mandated registration pro-
cess and its antifraud provisions, the Securities Act attempts 
to ensure that investors receive accurate and meaningful infor-
mation about the offered securities and their issuing firms.54 
 
The Exchange Act, in turn, governs the subsequent trading 
of those securities in secondary markets.55 Like the Securities 
Act, the Exchange Act attempts to ensure that investors in those 
secondary markets receive accurate and meaningful information 
about the offered securities and their issuing firms.56  
 
The Exchange Act works to achieve this purpose by re-
quiring periodic reporting filings and by imposing a broad anti-
fraud provision in Section 10.57 
                                                                                                                        
50 Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, ‘Pure Information,’ 
and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1601 (2012). 
51 15 U.S.C. § 77a–aa (2000). 
52 § 78a–mm; see John C. Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for 
Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 641, 683 (1999). 
53 John L. Campbell, Hsinchun Chen, Dan S. Dhaliwal, Hsin-min Lu, & 
Logan B. Steele, The Information Content of Mandatory Risk Factor Disclosures in 
Corporate Filings, 19 REV. ACCT. STUD. 396, 397 (2014). 
54 Trautman, supra note 1, at 269. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See Stephen J. Brown, William N. Goetzmann, Bing Liang & Christopher 
Schwarz, Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge 
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Fast forward a few years and the United States undergoes a 
traumatic meltdown of its financial markets during 2008 and 
2009.58 Professor Hu contends that the SEC’s disclosure philosophy: 
 
has always been substantially implemented through what can 
be conceptualized as an ‘intermediary depiction’ model. An in-
termediary—e.g., a corporation issuing shares—stands between 
the investor and an objective reality. The intermediary observes 
that reality, crafts a depiction of the reality’s pertinent aspects, 
and transmits the depiction to investors. Securities law directs 
that depictions are to be accurate and complete. ‘Information’ 
is conceived of in terms of, if not equated to, such depictions.59 
 
Professor Hu argues that “Modern financial innovation has 
resulted in objective realities that are far more complex than in 
the past, often beyond the capacity of the English language, ac-
counting terminology, visual display, risk measurement, and other 
tools on which all depictions must primarily rely.”60 Of particu-
lar importance to this inquiry, Professor Lin observes that “in 
theory, Risk Factors are intended to inform investors of each firm’s 
deepest fears and gravest vulnerabilities” [emphasis added].61 How 
Internet powerhouse Google perceive their greatest threat of risk 
is the subject of this discussion. 
                                                                                                                        
Fund Registration, 63 J. FIN 2785, 2785–86 (2008); Todd D. Kravet & Volkan 
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58 Trautman, supra note 1, at 269. 
59 Hu, supra note 50, at 1601. 
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IV. LESSONS FROM ALPHABET AND GOOGLE 
During October 2017, the market capitalization of Alphabet, 
Inc., Google’s parent, rose above $700 billion for the first time, 
second only among the S&P 500 to Apple ($842.2 billion).62 For 
perspective, it is interesting to note that Microsoft Corp. ranks 
third, having a market cap of $646.6 billion.63 To understand the 
nature of Google’s perceived risk regarding customer privacy, 
political and regulatory compliance, e-commerce, and cyber, let’s 
first look at the fundamental nature of the businesses involved. 
A. General: Alphabet and Google 
Google LLC was incorporated under the laws of the State 
of California in 1998 and reincorporated as a Delaware corpora-
tion in 2003.64 Google describes its primary core products or 
business as, “Search, Android, Maps, Chrome, YouTube, Google 
Play, and Gmail [with each having] over one billion monthly 
active users.”65 Google’s stated mission is “to organize the world’s 
                                                                                                                        
62 See Ben Eisen, $713.2 Billion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2017, at B9. 
63 Id. 
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Kirthi Kalyanam, John McAteer, Jonathan Marek, James A. Hodges & Lifeng 
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Soghoian, The Problem of Anonymous Vanity Searches, 3 ISJLP 299, 303 (2007); 
Florence Thépot, Market Power in Online Search and Social-Networking: A 
Matter of Two-Sided Markets, 36 WORLD COMPETITION 195, 196, 201, 206 (2013); 
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information and make it universally accessible and useful....”66 
There can be little doubt that Google is having a very positive 
impact on the lives of many worldwide.67 
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Salkin, From Bricks and Mortar to Mega-Bytes and Mega-Pixels: The Changing 
Landscape of the Impact of Technology and Innovation on Urban Develop-
ment, 42/43 URB. L. 11, 12, 21–22 (2011); Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, 
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During 2015, Alphabet, Inc. became successor to Google 
pursuant to a holding company reorganization.68 Alphabet and 
Google are headquartered in Mountain View, California.69 For 
Alphabet, Google is the only reportable segment, since no “other 
segments meet the quantitative thresholds to qualify as report-
able segments; therefore, the other operating segments are com-
bined and disclosed below as other bets.”70 Accordingly, reported 
segments are as follows: 
 
Google—Google includes our main internet products such 
as Search, Ads, Commerce, Maps, YouTube, Google Cloud, An-
droid, Chrome, and Google Play as well as our hardware initi-
atives. Our technical infrastructure and some newer efforts like 
virtual reality are also included in Google. Google generates rev-
enues primarily from advertising; sales of apps, in-app pur-
chases, and digital content; services fees for cloud offerings; 
and sales of hardware products. 
 
Other Bets—Other Bets is a combination of multiple op-
erating segments that are not individually material. Other Bets 
includes businesses such as Access, Calico, CapitalG, GV, Nest, 
Verily, Waymo, and X. Revenues from the Other Bets are de-
rived primarily through the sales of internet and TV services 
through Google Fiber, sales of Nest products and services, and 
licensing and R&D services through Verily.71 
 
As of September 30, 2017, total Alphabet employment head-
count numbered 78,101 of which most are employed by Google.72 
As of December 31, 2016, full-time employees numbered 72,053, 
of which 27,169 worked in research and development; sales and 
marketing accounted for 20,902; operations employed 14,287; and 
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9,695 were involved in general and administrative positions.73 
Alphabet has also announced expectations that Google will be 
reorganized into a limited liability company.74 
B. How Google Views Risk 
Corporate risk is a topic that is receiving increased focus 
by management and boards of directors during recent years.75 
Reports of cyber threats and data security breaches continue to 
grow by alarming proportions.76 Various forms of cybercrime listed 
by Pinguelo and Muller include: “economic or foreign espionage, 
malicious insiders, spamming, phishing, email extraction programs, 
and hacking.”77 In previous articles I have discussed how “few oper-
ational areas ... present as much inherent risk or prove as diffi-
cult [for boards of directors] to govern as Information Technology.”78 
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All Internet centric enterprises must be concerned with is-
sues of user privacy, cyber, e-commerce, political and regulatory 
compliance risks and are exposed to numerous potential risks, 
including: cybercrime,79 cyberterrorism,80 electronic crime, in-
frastructure security, intellectual property protection, Internet 
governance,81 jurisdictional disputes, and legal restrictions and 
obligations (regulations and privacy laws).82 
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Google discusses the following categories of risk factors that 
may impact operating results, including: risks related to Google’s 
businesses and industries; intense competition; revenues; invest-
ment in new businesses and products; evolution in search devices; 
future pressure on operating margins; increased regulatory 
scrutiny;83 new and existing laws;84 claims, suits, and govern-
ment investigations; online services or content liability; privacy 
concerns; user data security; intellectual property liability; loss 
of intellectual property; acquisition risk; importance of brands; 
supply chain and manufacturing; web spam; information tech-
nology; fluctuation of operating results; key personnel; Internet 
access;85 other technological risk; investments; tax liabilities; 
and international risk.86 Accordingly, Google provides the follow-
ing risk disclosures and states that: 
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operations and financial results are subject to various risks 
and uncertainties, including but not limited to those described 
below, which could adversely affect our business, financial condi-
tion, results of operations, cash flows, and the trading price of 
our common and capital stock.87 
C. Risks Related to Google’s Businesses and Industries 
1. Intense Competition 
We face intense competition. If we do not continue to innovate 
and provide products and services that are useful to users, we 
may not remain competitive, and our revenues and operating 
results could be adversely affected. 
 
Our businesses are rapidly evolving, intensely competitive, 
and subject to changing technologies, shifting user needs, and 
frequent introductions of new products and services. Competing 
successfully depends heavily on our ability to accurately anti-
cipate technology developments and deliver innovative products 
and technologies to the marketplace rapidly and, for Google, 
provide products and services that make our search results 
and ads relevant and useful for our users. As our businesses 
evolve, the competitive pressure to innovate will encompass a 
wider range of products and services, including products and 
services that may be outside of our historical core business. As a 
result, we must continue to invest significant resources in 
research and development, including through acquisitions, in 
order to enhance our search technology and our existing products 
and services, and introduce new products and services that 
people can easily and effectively use. 
 
We have many competitors in different industries, including 
general purpose search engines and information services; vertical 
search engines and e-commerce websites; social networks; other 
forms of advertising and online advertising platforms and net-
works; companies that design, manufacture, and market con-
sumer electronic products; providers of enterprise cloud services 
and digital video services; and digital assistant providers. Our 
current and potential domestic and international competitors 
range from large and established companies to emerging start-
ups. Some large companies have longer operating histories and 
more established relationships with customers and users, and 
they can use their experiences and resources in ways that could 
affect our competitive position, including by making acquisitions, 
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continuing to invest research and development, aggressively 
initiating intellectual property claims (whether or not merito-
rious), and continuing to compete aggressively for advertisers 
and websites. Emerging start-ups may be able to innovate and 
provide products and services faster than we can or may foresee 
the consumer need for products and services before us. 
 
In addition, new products and services can sometimes present 
new and difficult technological and legal challenges, which may 
negatively impact our brands and demand for our products 
and services and adversely impact our revenues and operating 
results. Our operating results would also suffer if our innovations 
are not responsive to the needs of our users, advertisers, and 
Google Network Members; are not appropriately timed with 
market opportunities; or are not effectively brought to market. 
As technology continues to develop, our competitors may be 
able to offer user experiences that are, or that are seen to be, 
substantially similar to or better than ours. This may force us 
to compete in different ways and expend significant resources 
in order to remain competitive. If our competitors are more 
successful than we are in developing compelling products or in 
attracting and retaining users, advertisers, and content providers, 
our revenues and operating results could be adversely affected.88 
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2. Revenues 
We generate substantially all of our revenues from adver-
tising, and reduced spending by advertisers or a loss of partners 
could harm our business. 
 
We generated 88 [percent] of total revenues from adver-
tising in 2016. Many of our advertisers, companies that distribute 
our products and services, digital publishers, and content 
partners can terminate their contracts with us at any time. 
Those partners may not continue to do business with us if we 
do not create more value (such as increased numbers of users 
or customers, new sales leads, increased brand awareness, or 
more effective monetization) than their available alternatives. 
If we do not provide superior value or deliver advertisements 
efficiently and competitively, we could see a decrease in revenue 
and other adverse impacts to our business. In addition, expendi-
tures by advertisers tend to be cyclical, reflecting overall economic 
conditions and budgeting and buying patterns. Adverse macroeco-
nomic conditions can also have a material negative impact on 
user activity and the demand for advertising and cause our 
advertisers to reduce the amounts they spend on advertising, 
which could adversely affect our revenues and business.89 
3. Investment in New Businesses and Products 
Our ongoing investment in new businesses and new products, 
services, and technologies is inherently risky, and could disrupt 
our current operations. 
 
We have invested and expect to continue to invest in new 
businesses, products, services and technologies. The creation 
of Alphabet as a new holding company in 2015 and the in-
vestments that we are making across various areas in Google 
and Other Bets are a reflection of our ongoing efforts to innovate 
and provide products and services that are useful to users. 
Such endeavors may involve significant risks and uncertainties, 
including insufficient revenues from such investments to offset 
any new liabilities assumed and expenses associated with these 
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2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2701847; Fernando Diez, Promoting Competition 
in Digital Markets; A Case Against the Google Case, and the Futile Search of 
‘Neutrality’ in On-Line Searches 10, 15–16 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) 
(https://ssrn.com/abstract=2691058); Rufus Pollock, Is Google the Next Microsoft? 
Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Internet Search 3, 25 (Apr. 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=1265521). 
89 See Alphabet, Inc., supra note 11, at 7. 
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new investments, inadequate return of capital on our invest-
ments, distraction of management from current operations, 
use of alternative investment or compensation structures, and 
unidentified issues not discovered in our due diligence of such 
strategies and offerings that could cause us to fail to realize 
the anticipated benefits of such investments and incur unantici-
pated liabilities. Because these new ventures are inherently 
risky, no assurance can be given that such strategies and offerings 
will be successful and will not adversely affect our reputation, 
financial condition, and operating results.90 
4. Evolution in Search Devices 
More people are using devices other than desktop computers 
to access the Internet and accessing new devices to make search 
queries. If manufacturers and users do not widely adopt versions 
of our search technology, products, or operating systems developed 
for these devices, our business could be adversely affected. 
 
The number of people who access the Internet through de-
vices other than desktop computers, including mobile phones, 
smartphones, handheld computers such as laptops and tablets, 
video game consoles, digital assistants, and television set-top 
devices, is increasing dramatically. The functionality and user 
experience associated with some alternative devices may make 
the use of our products and services through such devices more 
difficult (or just different) and the versions of our products 
and services developed for these devices may not be compelling to 
users, manufacturers, or distributors of alternative devices. Each 
manufacturer or distributor may establish unique technical 
standards for its devices, and our products and services may 
not work or be viewable on these devices as a result. Some 
manufacturers may also elect not to include our products on 
their devices. In addition, search queries are increasingly being 
undertaken via “apps” tailored to particular devices or social 
media platforms, which could affect our search and advertising 
business over time. As new devices and platforms are continually 
being released, it is difficult to predict the problems we may en-
counter in adapting our products and services and developing 
competitive new products and services. We expect to continue 
to devote significant resources to the creation, support, and 
maintenance of products and services across multiple plat-
forms and devices. If we are unable to attract and retain a 
substantial number of alternative device manufacturers, sup-
pliers, distributors, developers, and users to our products and 
services, or if we are slow to develop products and technologies 
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that are more compatible with alternative devices and plat-
forms, we will fail to capture the opportunities available as 
consumers and advertisers continue to exist in a dynamic, 
multi-screen environment.91 
5. Future Pressure on Operating Margins 
Our revenue growth rate could decline over time, and we 
anticipate downward pressure on our operating margin in the 
future. 
 
Our revenue growth rate could decline over time as a 
result of a number of factors, including: 
? increasing competition, changes in property mix, 
platform mix, device mix, and geographical mix, 
? the challenges in maintaining our growth rate as 
our revenues increase to higher levels, 
? the evolution of the online advertising market, in-
cluding the increasing variety of online platforms 
for advertising, and the other markets in which we 
participate, and 
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? the rate of user adoption of our products, services, 
and technologies. 
We believe our margins could experience downward pressure 
as a result of increasing competition and increased costs for 
many aspects of our business as well as the continuing shift to 
mobile, changes in device mix, and the contribution of new 
businesses to overall revenue. For instance, the margin on 
revenues we generate from our Google Network Members is 
significantly less than the margin on revenues we generate 
from advertising on Google properties. Consequently, our margins 
will experience downward pressure if a greater percentage of 
our revenues comes from ads placed on our Google Network 
Members’ properties compared to revenues generated through 
ads placed on Google properties. Additionally, the margin we 
earn on revenues generated from our Google Network Members 
could decrease in the future if we pay an even larger percentage of 
advertising fees to our Google Network Members. 
 
Furthermore, in our multi-device world, we generate our 
advertising revenues increasingly from mobile and newer ad-
vertising formats, and the margins from the advertising revenues 
from these sources have generally been lower than those from 
traditional desktop search. We also expect our traffic acquisition 
costs (TAC) paid to our distribution partners to increase due 
to changes in device mix between mobile, desktop, and tablet, 
partner mix, partner agreement terms, and the percentage of 
queries channeled through paid access points. 
 
Additionally, our margins could experience downward pres-
sure because the margin on the sale of digital content, hardware 
products, and cloud-based services have generally been lower 
than those from traditional desktop search. Further, our margins 
could be impacted adversely if we spend a proportionately larger 
amount to promote new products and services or distribute 
certain products or if we invest more heavily in our innovation 
efforts across the Company (such as other Bets businesses) 
than we have historically.92 
6. Increased Regulatory Scrutiny 
Regulatory considerations and fines continue to have a ma-
terial impact on Google’s operations and financial results.93 For 
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example, Google discloses that “on June 27, 2017, the EC an-
nounced its decision that certain actions taken by Google regarding 
its display and ranking of shopping search results and ads 
infringed European competition law.”94 This EC decision proves 
very costly for Google, with a fine of €2.42 billion (equal to ap-
proximately $2.74 billion as of June 27, 2017).95 As a result of 
pushing the intersection of technology and consumer protection 
as it relates to new product demands, Google finds itself having 
become a licensed money transmitter under state law and is likely 
to be a power in future payment systems96: 
 
We are subject to increasing regulatory scrutiny that may 
negatively impact our business. Additionally, changes in poli-
cies governing a wide range of topics may adversely affect our 
business. 
 
The growth of our company and our expansion into a variety 
of new fields involves a variety of new regulatory issues, and 
we have experienced increased regulatory scrutiny as we have 
grown. For instance, various regulatory agencies are reviewing 
aspects of our search and other businesses. We continue to co-
operate with the European Commission and other regulatory 
authorities around the world in investigations they are con-
ducting with respect to our business.97 
 
Legislators and regulators may make legal and regulatory 
changes, or interpret and apply existing laws or policies in ways 
that make our products and services less useful to our users, 
require us to incur substantial costs, expose us to unanticipated 
civil or criminal liability, or cause us to change our business 
practices. Additionally, changes in social, political, and regulatory 
conditions or in laws and policies governing a wide range of 
topics may disrupt our business practices. These changes could 
negatively impact our business and results of operations in 
material ways.98 
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D. New and Existing Laws 
A variety of new and existing laws could subject us to claims 
or otherwise harm our business. 
 
We are subject to numerous U.S. and foreign laws and 
regulations covering a wide variety of subject matters. New 
laws and regulations (or new interpretations of existing laws 
and regulations) may also impact our business. For example, 
current and new patent laws such as U.S. patent laws and 
European patent laws may affect the ability of companies, 
including us, to protect their innovations and defend against 
claims of patent infringement. Similarly, changes to copyright 
laws being considered in Europe and elsewhere may increase 
costs or require companies, including us, to change or cease 
offering certain existing services. The costs of compliance with 
these laws and regulations are high and are likely to increase 
in the future. 
 
Claims have been, or may be, threatened and filed against 
us under both U.S. and foreign laws for defamation, invasion 
of privacy and other tort claims, unlawful activity, patent, 
copyright and trademark infringement, product liability, or other 
theories based on the nature and content of the materials 
searched and the ads posted by our users, our products and 
services, or content generated by our users. Furthermore, many of 
these laws do not contemplate or address the unique issues raised 
by a number of our new businesses, products, services and 
technologies. In addition, the applicability and scope of these 
laws, as interpreted by the courts, remain uncertain. For 
example, the laws relating to the liability of providers of online 
services are currently unsettled both within the U.S. and abroad. 
 
In addition, other laws that could subject us to claims or 
otherwise harm our business include, among others: 
 
                                                                                                                        
TECH. L.J. 405, 432 (2011); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Assessing the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Privacy Assessments, 14(2) IEEE SEC. & PRIV. 58, 59 (Mar./Apr. 
2016); Mark A. Jamison, Should Google Search Be Regulated as a Public 
Utility?, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 223, 245–46 (2013); K. Sabeel Rahman, Private 
Power, Public Values: Regulating Social Infrastructure in a Changing Eco-
nomy, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 116, 165 (forthcoming 2018); Robert E. Litan 
& Hal J. Singer, Are Google’s Search Results Unfair or Deceptive Under Sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act? (May 8, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (https://ssrn 
.com /abstract=2054751); Joshua Mitts, Predictive Regulation 10, 15 (Mar. 20, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2411816). 
32 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:001 
? We rely on statutory safe harbors, as set forth in 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the United 
States and the E-Commerce Directive in Europe, 
against copyright liability for various linking, 
caching, and hosting activities. Any legislation or 
court rulings impacting these safe harbors may 
adversely impact us. 
 
? The General Data Protection Regulation, coming into 
effect in Europe in May of 2018, which creates a 
range of new compliance obligations, and increases 
financial penalties for noncompliance significantly. 
 
? Court decisions such as the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
ruling issued by the European court, which allows 
individuals to demand that Google remove search 
results about them in certain instances, may limit 
the content we can show to our users and impose 
significant operational burdens.99 
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? Various U.S. and international laws that restrict 
the distribution of materials considered harmful 
to children and impose additional restrictions on 
the ability of online services to collect information 
from minors. 
 
? Data protection laws passed by many states and 
by certain countries outside the U.S. that require 
notification to users when there is a security 
breach for personal data, such as California’s 
Information Practices Act. 
 
? Data localization laws, which generally mandate that 
certain types of data collected in a particular country 
be stored and/or processed within that country. 
 
? We face risks and costs overseas as our products 
and services are offered in international markets and 
may be subject to additional regulations.100 Any fail-
ure on our part to comply with these laws and regu-
lations can result in negative publicity and diversion 
of management time and effort and may subject 
us to significant liabilities and other penalties.101 
E. Claims, Suits, and Government Investigations 
We are regularly subject to claims, suits, government in-
vestigations, and other proceedings that may result in adverse 
outcomes. 
 
We are regularly subject to claims, suits, and government 
investigations involving competition, intellectual property, pri-
vacy, consumer protection, tax, labor and employment, commer-
cial disputes, content generated by our users, goods and services 
offered by advertisers or publishers using our platforms, and 
other matters. The manufacturing and sale of an expanded 
suite of hardware products further exposes us to the risk of 
product liability and other litigation as well as consumer pro-
tection concerns related to product defects, as well as health 
and safety, hazardous materials usage, and other environmental 
concerns. We may also be subject to claims, including product 
warranty claims, if users experience service disruptions, failures, 
or other issues. In addition, our businesses face intellectual 
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property litigation, as further discussed later, that exposes us 
to the risk of exclusion and cease and desist orders, which 
could limit our ability to sell products and services. 
 
Such claims, suits, and government investigations are 
inherently uncertain and their results cannot be predicted 
with certainty of the outcome, any of these types of legal pro-
ceedings can have an adverse impact on us because of legal 
costs, diversion of management resources, and other factors. 
Determining reserves for our pending litigation is a complex, 
fact-intensive process that requires significant judgment. It is 
possible that a resolution of one or more such proceedings could 
result in substantial fines and penalties that could adversely 
affect our business, consolidated financial position, results of 
operations, or cash flows in a particular period. These proceedings 
could also result in reputational harm, criminal sanctions, 
consent decrees, or orders preventing us from offering certain 
features, functionalities, products, or services, requiring a change 
in our business practices or product recalls or corrections, or 
requiring development of non-infringing or otherwise altered 
products or technologies. Any of these con-sequences could 
adversely affect our business and results of operations.102 
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F. Online Services or Content Liability 
We may be subject to legal liability associated with providing 
online services or content. 
 
We host and provide a wide variety of services and products 
that enable users to exchange information, advertise products 
and services, conduct business, and engage in various online ac-
tivities both domestically and internationally. The law relating to 
the liability of providers of these online services and products 
for activities of their users is still somewhat unsettled both 
within the U.S. and internationally. Claims have been threatened 
and have been brought against us for defama-tion, negligence, 
breaches of contract, copyright or trademark infringement, unfair 
competition, unlawful activity, tort, including personal injury, 
fraud, or other theories based on the nature and content of 
information that we publish or to which we provide links or 
that may be posted online or generated by us or by third parties, 
including our users. In addition, we are and have been and 
may again in the future be subject to domestic or interna-
tional actions alleging that certain content we have generated 
or third-party content that we have made available within our 
services violates U.S. and non-U.S. law. 
 
We also place advertisements which are displayed on third-
party publishers and advertising networks properties, and we 
offer third-party party products, services, or content. We may 
be subject to claims concerning these products, services, or 
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content by virtue of our involvement in marketing, branding, 
broadcasting, or providing access to access to them, even if we 
do not ourselves host, operate, provide, or provide access to 
these products, services, or content. Defense of any such actions 
could be costly and involve significant time and attention of 
our management and other /resources, may result in monetary 
liabilities or penalties, and may require us to change our business 
in an adverse manner.103 
G. Privacy Concerns 
Privacy concerns relating to our technology could damage 
our reputation and deter current and potential users from 
using our products and services. 
 
From time to time, concerns have been expressed about 
whether our products, services, or processes compromise the 
privacy of users and others. Concerns about our practices with 
regard to the collection, use, disclosure, or security of personal 
information or other privacy related matters, even if un-
founded, could damage our reputation and adversely affect our 
operating results.104 
 
In addition, as nearly all of our products and services are 
web-based, the amount of data we store for our users on our 
servers (including personal information) has been increasing. 
Any systems failure or compromise of our security that results in 
the release of our users’ data could seriously harm our reputation 
and brand and, therefore, our business, and impair our ability 
to attract and retain users. We expect to continue to expend 
significant resources to create world-class security protections 
that shield against theft and security breaches. The risk that 
these types of events could seriously harm our business is 
likely to increase as we expand the number of web-based 
products and services we offer and operate in more countries, 
and as cyber-attacks by third parties become more sophisticated 
and targeted. Regulatory authorities around the world are 
considering a number of legislative and regulatory proposals 
concerning data protection, including measures to ensure that 
our encryption of users’ data does not hinder law enforcement 
agencies’ access to that data. In addition, the interpretation 
and application of consumer and data protection laws in the 
                                                                                                                        
103 Alphabet, Inc., supra note 11, at 22. 
104 Id.; see Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, A Descriptive Analysis 
of the Fourth Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, 28 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 73, 146–48 (2018). 
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U.S., Europe and elsewhere are often uncertain and in flux. It 
is possible that these laws may be interpreted and applied in 
a manner that is inconsistent with our data practices. If so, in 
addition to the possibility of fines, this could result in an order 
requiring that we change our data practices, which could have an 
adverse effect on our business and results of operations. Com-
plying with these various laws could cause us to incur sub-
stantial costs or require us to change our business practices in a 
manner adverse to our business. 
 
Recent legal developments in Europe have created com-
pliance uncertainty regarding certain transfers of information 
from Europe to the U.S. For example, the European Union 
and U.S. Privacy Shield framework was designed to allow for 
legal certainty regarding transfers of data. However, the agree-
ment itself faces a number of legal challenges and is subject to 
annual review. This has resulted in some uncertainty, and 
compliance obligations could cause us to incur costs or require 
us to change our business practices in a manner adverse to 
our business.105 
                                                                                                                        
105 Alphabet, Inc., supra note 11, at 22–24; see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE 
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Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your Digital Identity: 
A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual’s Image over the Inter-
net, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313, 315, 330, 342, 348, 361 (2009); Matthew T. 
Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. McCormick & Jintong Tang, The Law 
and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961, 1002–03, 1006 
(2017); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Beyond Google and Evil: How Policy Makers, 
Journalists and Consumers Should Talk Differently About Google and Privacy, 14 
FIRST MONDAY (April 2009), http://firstmonday.org/article/view/2326/2156 
[https://perma.cc/KEY8-UPWU]; Mary Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United 
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Google Earth World, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 333, 367–70 (2012); Randal 
C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 NW. REV. 
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Rubinstein & Joris van Hoboken, Privacy and Security in the Cloud: Some 
Realism About Technical Solutions to Transnational Surveillance in the Post-
Snowden Era, 66 ME. L. REV. 487, 499–500, 509–10 (2014); Sherry Denise 
Sanders, Privacy is Dead: The Birth of Social Media Background Checks, 39 
S.U. L. REV. 243, 263 (2012); Giovanni Sartor & Mario Viola de Azevedo 
Cunha, The Italian Google-Case: Privacy, Freedom of Speech and Responsibility of 
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H. User Data Security 
If our security measures are breached resulting in the 
improper use and disclosure of user data, or if our services are 
subject to attacks that degrade or deny the ability of users to 
access our products and services, our products and services may 
be perceived as not being secure, users and customers may 
curtail or stop using our products and services, and we may 
incur significant legal and financial exposure. 
 
Our products and services involve the storage and trans-
mission of users’ and customers’ proprietary information, and 
theft and security breaches expose us to a risk of loss of this 
information, improper use and disclosure of such information, 
litigation, and potential liability. We experience cyber-attacks 
of varying degrees on a regular basis. Our security measures 
may also be breached due to employee error, malfeasance, 
system errors or vulnerabilities, including vulnerabilities of 
our vendors, or otherwise. Such breach or unauthorized access, 
increased government surveillance, or attempts by outside 
parties to fraudulently induce employees, users, or customers 
to disclose sensitive information in order to gain access to our 
data or our users’ or customers’ data could result in significant 
legal and financial exposure, damage to our reputation, and a 
                                                                                                                        
Providers for User-Generated Contents, 18 INT’L. J.L. & INFO. TECH. 356, 363–64 
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(Colum. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Research Paper No. 
14-404, 2014); Jenny Mead et al., Google and Internet Privacy (B). (Darden 
Case No. UVA-E-0345, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1417207; Randal C. 
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Paper Series in L. and Econ., Working Paper No. 475, 2009); James C. Cooper, 
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loss of confidence in the security of our products and services 
that could potentially have an adverse effect on our business. 
Because the techniques used to obtain unauthorized access, 
disable or degrade service, or sabotage systems change frequently 
and often are not recognized until launched against a target, 
we may be unable to anticipate these techniques or to implement 
adequate preventative measures. If an actual or perceived breach 
of our security occurs, the market perception of the effectiveness 
of our security measures could be harmed and we could lose 
users and customers.106 
I. Intellectual Property Liability 
We are, and may in the future be, subject to intellectual 
property or other claims, which are costly to defend, could result 
in significant damage awards, and could limit our ability to 
use certain technologies in the future. 
 
Internet, technology, media, and other companies own large 
numbers of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets 
and frequently enter into litigation based on allegations of in-
fringement or other violations of intellectual property rights. 
In addition, patent holding companies may continue to seek to 
monetize patents they have purchased or otherwise obtained. 
As we have grown, the intellectual property rights claims 
against us have increased and may continue to increase as we 
develop new products, services, and technologies. 
 
We have had patent, copyright, and trademark infringement 
lawsuits filed against us claiming that certain of our products, 
services, and technologies infringe the intellectual property rights 
of others. Third parties have also sought broad injunctive relief 
against us by filing claims in U.S. and international courts and 
the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) for exclusion 
and cease and desist orders, which could limit our ability to sell 
our products or services in the U.S. or elsewhere if our products 
or services or those of our customers or suppliers are found to 
infringe the intellectual property subject to the claims. Adverse 
results in any of these lawsuits may include awards of substan-
tial monetary damages, costly royalty or licensing agreements 
(if licenses are available at all), or orders preventing us from 
offering certain features, functionalities, products, or services, 
and may also cause us to change our business practices, and 
require development of non-infringing products or technologies, 
which could result in a loss of revenues for us and otherwise 
harm our business. 
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Many of our agreements with our customers and partners, 
including certain suppliers, require us to indemnify them for 
certain intellectual property infringement claims against them, 
which could increase our costs as a result of defending such 
claims, and may require that we pay significant damages if there 
were an adverse ruling in any such claims.107 Such customers 
and partners may also discontinue the use of our products, 
services, and technologies, as a result of injunctions or otherwise, 
which could result in loss of revenues and adversely impact our 
business. Moreover, intellectual property indemnities provided to 
us by our suppliers, when obtainable, may not cover all damages 
and losses suffered by us and our customers from covered 
products. Furthermore, in connection with our divestitures, we 
have agreed, and may in the future agree, to provide indemni-
fication for certain potential liabilities. 
 
Regardless of the merits of the claims, intellectual property 
claims are often time consuming, expensive to litigate or settle, 
and cause significant diversion of management attention. To the 
extent such intellectual property infringement claims are suc-
cessful, they may have an adverse effect on our business, con-
solidated financial position, results of operations, or cash flows.108 
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1. Loss of Intellectual Property 
Our intellectual property rights are valuable, and any in-
ability to protect them could reduce the value of our products, 
services, and brand. 
 
Our patents, trademarks, trade secrets, copyrights, and other 
intellectual property rights are important assets for us. Various 
events outside of our control pose a threat to our intellectual 
property rights, as well as to our products, services and tech-
nologies. For example, effective intellectual property protection 
may not be available in every country in which our products 
and services are distributed or made available through the In-
ternet. Also, the efforts we have taken to protect our proprietary 
rights may not be sufficient or effective. Although we seek to 
obtain patent protection for our innovations, it is possible we 
may not be able to protect some of these innovations. Moreover, 
we may not have adequate patent or copyright protection for 
certain innovations that later turn out to be important. 
Furthermore, there is always the possibility, despite our efforts, 
that the scope of the protection gained will be insufficient or 
that an issued patent may be deemed invalid or unenforceable. 
 
We also seek to maintain certain intellectual property as 
trade secrets. The secrecy could be compromised by outside 
parties, or by our employees, which could cause us to lose the 
competitive advantage resulting from these trade secrets. We 
also face risks associated with our trademarks. For example, 
there is a risk that the word “Google” could become so commonly 
used that it becomes synonymous with the word “search.” If 
this happens, we could lose protection for this trademark, 
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which could result in other people using the word “Google” to 
refer to their own products, thus diminishing our brand. 
 
Any significant impairment of our intellectual property rights 
could harm our business and our ability to compete. Also, pro-
tecting our intellectual property rights is costly and time con-
suming. Any increase in the unauthorized use of our intellectual 
property could make it more expensive to do business and 
harm our operating results.109 
J. Acquisition Risk 
Acquisitions, joint ventures, investments, and divestitures 
could result in operating difficulties, dilution, and other con-
sequences that may adversely impact our business and results of 
operations. 
 
Acquisitions, joint ventures, investments and divestitures, 
are important elements of our overall corporate strategy and 
use of capital, and these transactions could be material to our 
financial condition and results of operations. We expect to con-
tinue to evaluate and enter into discussions regarding a wide 
array of potential strategic transactions. Effecting these potential 
strategic transactions could create unforeseen operating diffi-
culties and expenditures. The areas where we face risks include: 
 
? Diversion of management time and focus from op-
erating our business to challenges related to acquisi-
tions and other strategic transactions. 
 
? Failure to successfully further develop the acquired 
business or technology. 
 
? Implementation or remediation of controls, pro-
cedures, and policies at the acquired company. 
 
? Integration of the acquired company’s accounting, 
human resource, and other administrative systems, 
and coordination of product, engineering, and sales 
and marketing functions. 
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? Transition of operations, users, and customers onto 
our existing platforms. 
 
? Failure to obtain required approvals on a timely 
basis, if at all, from governmental authorities, or 
conditions placed upon approval that could, among 
other things, delay or prevent us from completing 
a transaction, or otherwise restrict our ability to 
realize the expected financial or strategic goals of 
an acquisition or other strategic transaction. 
 
? In the case of foreign acquisitions, the need to 
integrate operations across different cultures and 
languages and to address the particular economic, 
currency, political, and regulatory risks associated 
with specific countries. 
 
? Cultural challenges associated with integrating 
employees from the acquired company into our 
organization, and retention of employees from the 
businesses we acquire. 
 
? Liability for activities of the acquired company before 
the acquisition, including patent and trademark 
infringement claims, privacy issues, violations of 
laws, commercial disputes, tax liabilities, and other 
known and unknown liabilities. 
 
? Litigation or other claims in connection with the 
acquired company, including claims from terminated 
employees, customers, former stockholders, or other 
third parties. 
 
Our failure to address these risks or other problems en-
countered in connection with our past or future acquisitions 
and other strategic transactions could cause us to fail to realize 
their anticipated benefits, incur unanticipated liabilities, and 
harm our business generally. 
 
Our acquisitions could also result in dilutive issuances of 
our equity securities, the incurrence of debt, contingent liabilities, 
or amortization expenses, or impairment of goodwill and/or 
purchased long-lived assets, and restructuring charges, any of 
which could harm our financial condition or results. Also, the 
anticipated benefits or value of our acquisitions and other 
strategic transactions may not materialize. In connection with 
our divestitures, we have agreed, and may in the future agree, to 
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provide indemnification for certain potential liabilities, which 
may adversely impact our financial condition or results.110 
K. Importance of Brands 
Our business depends on strong brands, and failing to 
maintain and enhance our brands would hurt our ability to 
expand our base of users, advertisers, Google Network Members, 
and other partners. 
 
Our strong brands have significantly contributed to the 
success of our business. Maintaining and enhancing the brands of 
both Google and Other Bets increases our ability to enter new 
categories and launch new and innovative products that better 
serve the needs of our users. Our brands may be negatively 
impacted by a number of factors, including, among others, 
reputational issues and product/technical performance failures. 
Further, if we fail to maintain and enhance equity in equity 
in the Google brand, our business, operating results, and 
financial condition may be materially and adversely affected. 
Maintaining and enhancing our brands will depend largely on 
our ability to remain a technology leader and continue to provide 
high-quality, innovative products and services that are truly 
useful and play a meaningful role in people’s everyday lives.111 
L. Supply Chain and Manufacturing 
We face a number of manufacturing and supply chain risks 
that, if not properly managed, could adversely impact our fi-
nancial results and prospects. 
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We face a number of risks related to manufacturing and 
supply chain management. We may enter into long term con-
tracts that commit us to significant terms and conditions of 
supply. We may be liable for material and product that is not 
consumed due to market acceptance, technological change, ob-
solescence, quality, product recalls, and warranty issues. For 
instance, the products we sell may have quality issues resulting 
from the design or manufacture of the product, or from the 
software used in the product. Sometimes, these issues may be 
caused by components we purchase from other manufacturers 
or suppliers. If the quality of our products does not meet our 
customers’ expectations or our products are found to be defective, 
then our sales and operating earnings, and ultimately our 
reputation, could be negatively impacted. 
 
We rely on third parties to manufacture many of our 
assemblies and finished products, and we have third-party 
arrangements for the design of some components and parts. 
Our business could be negatively affected if we are not able to 
engage third parties with the necessary capabilities or capacity on 
reasonable terms, or if those we engage fail to meet their 
obligations (whether due to financial difficulties or other reasons), 
or make adverse changes in the pricing or other material 
terms of our arrangements with them. 
 
We have in the past, and may experience in the future, 
supply shortages and price increases driven by raw material 
availability, manufacturing capacity, labor shortages, industry 
allocations, natural disasters and significant changes in the 
financial or business condition of our suppliers. We may 
experience shortages or other supply chain disruptions in the 
future that could negatively impact our operations. In addition, 
some of the components we use in our products are available 
only from a single source or limited sources, and we may not 
be able to find replacement vendors on favorable terms or at 
all in the event of a supply chain disruption. 
 
Additionally, because many of our supply contracts have 
volume-based pricing or minimum purchase requirements, if 
the volume of our hardware sales decreases or does not reach 
projected targets, we could face increased materials and manu-
facturing costs or other financial liabilities that could make 
our products more costly per unit to manufacture and therefore 
less competitive and negatively impact our financial results. 
Further, certain of our competitors may negotiate more favorable 
contractual terms based on volume and other commitments 
that may provide them with competitive advantages and may 
impact our supply. 
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We also require our suppliers and business partners to 
comply with law and company policies regarding workplace 
and employment practices, data security, environmental com-
pliance and intellectual property licensing, but we do not 
control them or their practices. If any of them violates laws or 
implements practices regarded as unethical, we could experience 
supply chain disruptions, canceled orders, terminations of or 
damage to key relationships, and damage to our reputation. If 
any of them fails to procure necessary license rights to third-
party intellectual property, legal action could ensue that could 
impact the salability of our products and expose us to financial 
obligations to third parties. 
 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act includes disclosure requirements regarding the use 
of certain minerals mined from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and adjoining countries (DRC) and procedures pertaining 
to a manufacturer’s efforts regarding the source of such minerals. 
SEC rules implementing these requirements may have the effect 
of reducing the pool of suppliers who can supply DRC “conflict 
free” components and parts, and we may not be able to obtain 
DRC conflict free products or supplies in sufficient quantities 
for our operations. Since our supply chain is complex, we may 
face reputational challenges with our customers, stockholders 
and other stakeholders if we are unable to sufficiently verify 
the origins for the minerals used in our products.112 
M. Web Spam 
Web spam and content farms could decrease our search 
quality, which could damage our reputation and deter our current 
and potential users from using our products and services. 
 
“Web spam” refers to websites that attempt to violate a 
search engine’s quality guidelines or that otherwise seek to 
rank higher in search results than a search engine’s assessment 
of their relevance and utility would rank them. 
 
Although English-language web spam in our search results 
has been significantly reduced, and web spam in most other 
languages is limited, we expect web spammers will continue 
to seek ways to improve their rankings inappropriately. We 
continuously combat web spam, including through indexing 
technology that makes it harder for spam-like, less useful web 
content to rank highly. We face challenges from low-quality 
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and irrelevant content websites, including “content farms”, which 
are websites that generate large quantities of low-quality content 
to help them improve their search rankings. We are continually 
launching algorithmic changes focused on low-quality websites. If 
our search results display an increasing number of web spam 
and content farms, this could hurt our reputation for delivering 
relevant information or reduce user traffic to our websites. In 
addition, as we continue to take actions to improve our search 
quality and reduce low-quality content, this may in the short 
run reduce our AdSense revenues, since some of these websites 
are AdSense partners.113 
N. Information Technology 
Interruption or failure of our information technology and 
communications systems could hurt our ability to effectively 
provide our products and services, which could damage our 
reputation and harm our operating results. 
 
The availability of our products and services depends on 
the continuing operation of our information technology and 
communications systems. Our systems are vulnerable to damage 
or interruption from earthquakes, terrorist attacks, natural 
disasters, the effects of climate change (such as sea level rise, 
drought, flooding, wildfires, and increased storm severity), power 
loss, telecommunications failures, computer viruses, computer 
denial of service attacks, or other attempts to harm our 
systems. Some of our data centers are located in areas with a 
high risk of major earthquakes. Our data centers are also subject 
to break-ins, sabotage, and intentional acts of vandalism, and 
to potential disruptions if the operators of certain of these 
facilities have financial difficulties. Some of our systems are not 
fully redundant, and our disaster recovery planning cannot 
account for all eventualities. The occurrence of a natural disaster, 
a decision to close a facility we are using, or other unantici-
pated problems at our data centers could result in lengthy 
interruptions in our service. In addition, our products and 
services are highly technical and complex and may contain errors 
or vulnerabilities, which could result in interruptions in our 
services or the failure of our systems.114 
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O. Fluctuation of Operating Results 
Our operating results may fluctuate, which makes our re-
sults difficult to predict and could cause our results to fall 
short of expectations. 
 
Our operating results may fluctuate as a result of a number 
of factors, many outside of our control. As a result, comparing 
our operating results on a period-to-period basis may not be 
meaningful, and you should not rely on our past results as an 
indication of our future performance. Our quarterly, year-to-
date, and annual expenses as a percentage of our revenues may 
differ significantly from our historical or projected rates. Our 
operating results in future quarters may fall below expectations. 
Any of these events could cause our stock price to fall. Each of 
the risk factors listed in this section in addition to the fol-
lowing factors may affect our operating results: 
 
? Our ability to continue to attract users to our web-
sites and retain existing users on our websites. 
 
? Our ability to monetize (or generate revenues from) 
traffic on Google properties and our Google Network 
Members’ properties across various devices. 
 
? Advertising revenue fluctuations caused by changes 
in property mix, platform mix, device mix, and 
geographical mix. 
 
? The amount of revenues and expenses generated 
and incurred in currencies other than U.S. dollars, 
and our ability to manage the resulting risk through 
our foreign exchange risk management program. 
 
? The amount and timing of operating costs and 
expenses and capital expenditures related to the 
maintenance and expansion of our businesses, opera-
tions, and infrastructure. 
 
? Our focus on long-term goals over short-term results. 
 
? The results of our acquisitions, divestitures, and 
our investments in risky projects, including new 
businesses, products, services, and technologies. 
 
? Our ability to keep our websites operational at a 
reasonable cost and without service interruptions 
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? Our ability to generate significant revenues from 
new products and services in which we have in-
vested considerable time and resources. 
 
Because our businesses are changing and evolving, our 
historical operating results may not be useful to you in predicting 
our future operating results. In addition, advertising spending 
has historically been cyclical in nature, reflecting overall eco-
nomic conditions, as well as well as budgeting and buying 
patterns. Also, user traffic tends to be seasonal. Our rapid 
growth has tended to mask the cyclicality and seasonality of 
our business. As our growth rate has slowed, the cyclicality 
and seasonality in our business has become more pronounced 
and caused our operating results to fluctuate.115 
P. Key Personnel 
If we were to lose the services of Larry, Sergey, Eric, 
Sundar, or other key personnel, we may not be able to execute 
our business strategy. 
 
Our future success depends in a large part upon the 
continued service of key members of our senior management 
team. In particular, Larry Page and Sergey Brin are critical 
to the overall management of Alphabet and its subsidiaries, 
and they, along with Sundar Pichai, the Chief Executive 
Officer of Google, play an important role in the development 
of our technology. Along with our Executive Chairman Eric E. 
Schmidt, they also play a key role in maintaining our culture 
and setting our strategic direction. All of our executive officers 
and key employees are at-will employees, and we do not main-
tain any key-person life insurance policies. The loss of key 
personnel could seriously harm our business. 
 
We rely on highly skilled personnel and, if we are unable 
to retain or motivate key personnel, hire qualified personnel, 
or maintain our corporate culture, we may not be able to grow 
effectively. 
 
Our performance largely depends on the talents and 
efforts of highly skilled individuals. Our future success depends 
on our continuing ability to identify, hire, develop, motivate, 
and retain highly skilled personnel for all areas of our organi-
zation. Competition in our industry for qualified employees is 
intense, and certain of our competitors have directly targeted 
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our employees. In addition, our compensation arrangements, 
such as our equity award programs, may not always be suc-
cessful in attracting new employees and retaining and motivating 
our existing employees. Our continued ability to compete 
effectively depends on our ability to attract new employees 
and to retain and motivate our existing employees. 
 
In addition, we believe that our corporate culture fosters 
innovation, creativity, and teamwork. As our organization grows, 
and we are required to implement more complex organizational 
management structures, particularly in light of our holding 
company structure, we may find it increasingly difficult to 
maintain the beneficial aspects of our corporate culture. This 
could negatively impact our future success.116 
Q. Internet Access 
Our business depends on continued and unimpeded access 
to the Internet by us and our users. Internet access providers 
may be able to restrict, block, degrade, or charge for access to 
certain of our products and services, which could lead to 
additional expenses and the loss of users and advertisers. 
 
Our products and services depend on the ability of our 
users to access the Internet, and certain of our products require 
significant bandwidth to work effectively. Currently, this 
access is provided by companies that have significant market 
power in the broadband and internet access marketplace, 
including incumbent telephone companies, cable companies, 
mobile communications companies, and government-owned 
service providers. Some of these providers have taken, or have 
stated that they may take measures, including legal actions, 
that could degrade, disrupt, or increase the cost of user access 
to certain of our products by restricting or prohibiting the use 
of their infrastructure to support or facilitate our offerings, or 
by charging increased fees to us or our users to provide our 
offerings. In addition, in some jurisdictions, our products and 
services have been subject to government-initiated restrictions or 
blockages. Such interference could result in a loss of existing 
users and advertisers, and increased costs, and could impair 
our ability to attract new users and advertisers, thereby harming 
our revenues and growth.117 
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R. Other Technological Risk 
New and existing technologies could block ads online, which 
would harm our business. 
 
Technologies have been developed that can block the display 
of ads online and that provide tools to users to opt out of seeing 
ads online. Most of our Google revenues are derived from fees 
paid to us in connection with the display of ads online. As a 
result, such technologies and tools could adversely affect our 
operating results.118 
S. Investments 
We are exposed to fluctuations in the market values of our 
investments. 
 
Given the global nature of our business, we have investments 
both domestically and internationally. Credit ratings and market 
values of these investments can be negatively impacted by 
liquidity, credit deterioration or losses, financial results, foreign 
exchange rates, changes in interest rates, or other factors. As 
a result, the value or liquidity of our cash equivalents and 
marketable securities could decline and result in a material 
impairment, which could materially adversely affect our financial 
condition and operating results.119 
T. Tax Liabilities 
We could be subject to changes in tax rates, the adoption 
of new U.S. or international tax legislation, or exposure to 
additional tax liabilities. 
 
Our future income taxes could be adversely affected by 
earnings being lower than anticipated in jurisdictions that 
have lower statutory tax rates and higher than anticipated in 
jurisdictions that have higher statutory tax rates, the net 
gains and losses recognized by legal entities on certain hedges 
and related hedged intercompany and other transactions under 
our foreign exchange risk management program, changes in 
the valuation of our deferred tax assets or liabilities, or changes 
in tax laws, regulations, or accounting principles, as well as 
certain discrete items. Due to shifting economic and political 
conditions, tax policies or rates in various jurisdictions may 
be subject to significant change. 
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In addition, we are subject to regular review and audit by 
both domestic and foreign tax authorities. As a result, we have 
received, and may in the future receive, assessments in multiple 
jurisdictions on various tax-related assertions, including transfer 
pricing adjustments or permanent establishment. Any adverse 
outcome of such a review or audit could have a negative effect on 
our operating results and financial condition. In addition, the 
determination of our worldwide provision for income taxes 
and other tax liabilities requires significant judgment, and 
there are many transactions and calculations where the ultimate 
tax determination is uncertain. Although we believe our es-
timates are reasonable, the ultimate tax outcome may differ 
from the amounts recorded in our financial statements and may 
materially affect our financial results in the period or periods 
for which such determination is made.120 
V. INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION 
Many, if not most businesses located anywhere in the world 
today derive over half of their total revenues from outside their 
home jurisdictions.121 For any enterprise, worldwide expansion 
brings increased cost of doing business by virtue of increased 
internal control challenges and because of being subjected to 
numerous and often conflicting laws and regulations including: 
conflicting local values,122 data privacy and filtering rules;123 
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disclosure and internal control rules;124 anti-corruption laws such as 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and U.K. Bribery Act 
2010;125 intellectual property considerations,126 and business 
practices or laws favoring local competitors.127 Professor Tabrez 
Ahmad observes: 
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... That the internet is a worldwide application. It involves 
international protocols and conventions as well as state and 
national legislation.... 
 
In addition to the international sale of goods, there is a 
blossoming of electronic services that were previously only 
available through hard-line links to service providers. Internet 
retailing, banking, and data exchange now flow over computer 
grids and satellite systems. Deals are closed not with a hand-
shake, but with an exchange of private keys. 
 
Cyberspace is the complete value chain that links suppliers, 
producers, retailers, and customers. Companies that do not plan 
to enter the e-Commerce arena themselves, still have to deal 
with clients and customers whose only presence will be in the 
form of full-service electronic storefronts. These companies will 
have to adjust their strategic plan to include electronic media 
in their businesses. Understanding the novel legal issues that 
arise in relation to, the Internet, electronic commerce and online 
services, as well as the laws and jurisdictional matters that 
apply to e-commerce applications, will be the instrument of 
success in positioning a business in the electronic marketplace.128 
A. Google on International Risk 
International risk proves to be demanding for such a high-
profile enterprise such as Google.129 In particular, Google’s diffi-
culties in navigating operations and political considerations in 
China are the subject of considerable note.130 
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Our international operations expose us to additional risks 
that could harm our business, operating results, and financial 
condition. 
Our international operations are significant to our reve-
nues and net income, and we plan to continue to grow interna-
tionally. International revenues accounted for approximately 53 
[percent] of our consolidated revenues in 2016. In certain in-
ternational markets, we have limited operating experience and 
may not benefit from any first-to-market advantages or oth-
erwise succeed. 
 
In addition to risks described elsewhere in this section, 
our international operations expose us to other risks, includ-
ing the following: 
 
? Restrictions on foreign ownership and investments, 
and stringent foreign exchange controls that might 
prevent us from repatriating cash earned in coun-
tries outside the U.S. 
 
? Import and export requirements, tariffs, trade dis-
putes and barriers, and customs classifications that 
may prevent us from offering products or providing 
services to a particular market and may increase 
our operating costs. 
 
? Longer payment cycles in some countries, increased 
credit risk, and higher levels of payment fraud. 
 
? Still developing foreign laws and legal systems. 
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? Uncertainty regarding liability for services and 
content, including uncertainty as a result of local 
laws and lack of legal precedent. 
 
Different employee/employer relationships, existence of work-
ers’ councils and labor unions, and other challenges caused by 
distance, language, and cultural differences, making it harder 
to do business in certain jurisdictions. 
 
Additionally, changes in international local political, eco-
nomic, regulatory, tax, social, and labor conditions may adversely 
harm our business and compliance with complex foreign and 
U.S. laws and regulations that apply to our international op-
erations increases our cost of doing business. These numerous 
and sometimes conflicting laws and regulations include, among 
others, internal control and disclosure rules, privacy and data 
protection requirements, anti-corruption laws, such as the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and other local laws prohibiting 
corrupt payments to governmental officials, and competition 
regulations, among others. Violations of these laws and regu-
lations could result in fines and penalties, criminal sanctions 
against us, our officers, or our employees, prohibitions on the 
conduct of our business and on our ability to offer our prod-
ucts and services in one or more countries, and could also ma-
terially affect our brand, our international growth efforts, our 
ability to attract and retain employees, our business, and our 
operating results. Although we have implemented policies and 
procedures designed to ensure compliance with these laws and 
regulations, there can be no assurance that our employees, 
contractors, or agents will not violate our policies. 
 
Finally, since we conduct business in currencies other than 
U.S. dollars but report our financial results in U.S. dollars, we 
face exposure to fluctuations in currency exchange rates. Al-
though we hedge a portion of our international currency expo-
sure, significant fluctuations in exchange rates between the U.S. 
dollar and foreign currencies may adversely affect our revenues 
and earnings. Additionally, hedging programs are inherently 
risky and could expose us to additional risks that could adversely 
affect our financial condition and results of operations.131 
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B. Anti-Corruption 
Corruption in any of its various forms is a problem for any 
business. Previously, many have documented numerous exam-
ples of how the potential for significant exposure to internation-
al corruption and anti-bribery laws increases with expanding 
U.S. business operations around the globe.132 
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VI. COUNTERTERRORIST LAWS & POTENTIALLY ILLEGAL ACTIVITY 
A. Focus on Potentially Illegal Activity 
It is worth mentioning the increased instances of unau-
thorized disclosure of highly confidential, national intelligence, 
and personal financial information, including a large amount of 
highly sensitive data pursuant to the Edward Snowden133 and 
The Panama Papers disclosures.134 By now it is obvious that even 
the nation state intelligence services with the largest budgets 
have been unsuccessful in keeping their most highly confidential 
information safe.135 The 2016 disclosures known as The Panama 
Papers revealed personal offshore accounts of many sovereign 
leaders holding funds in many cases intended to be kept secret 
from the citizens they lead.136 In other instances, it appears that 
the motivation was to avoid taxing authorities.137 It is reasona-
ble to expect that prosecutions from The Panama Papers disclo-
sures may continue for years to come.138 
Another disturbing trend that I want to mention is the 
impact of Stuxnet and its progeny, a malware that functions to 
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disrupt industrial control systems.139 And next, we should all be 
aware of the increasing frequency of ransomware, as evidenced 
by the numerous disclosed attacks within recent months.140 
CONCLUSION 
E-commerce, the Internet, rapidly growing new technolo-
gies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and virtual reality, and 
mobile platforms are having a major impact on those engaged in 
e-commerce and electronic payment systems.141 Early recogni-
tion of relevant risks may prove helpful in avoiding increases in 
operating costs and reduce the risks of falling victim to threats 
involving the very survival of the enterprise. An examination of 
financial and regulatory disclosures by Alphabet and Google, as 
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, is helpful 
to the understanding of risks faced by most participants in the e-
commerce and electronic payment systems arena. 
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